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Abstract 
Based on the research object of majority shareholders’ stock selling at the post period of equity 
division reform, this paper takes 8019 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
market from 2007-2013 as sample, empirically analysis the relationship between social responsibility 
and majority shareholders’ stock selling, and consider mediation effect of the investor tendency. The 
study found that from the point of internal governance effect, the better of social responsibility, the 
lower possibility of majority shareholders’ stock selling. At the same time, the lower of market 
reduction premium, the lower possibility of majority shareholders’ stock selling, after considering the 
influence of investors’ tendency, the inhibition effect of social responsibility will be magnified, which 
means securities market identity with the inhibition effect that comes from the social responsibility 
caused by listed companies’ internal. Further study found that majority shareholders will avoid stock 
selling during the period of the social responsibility reporting, and market investors will hold different 
attitudes toward majority shareholders for their first and continuous stock selling, and on their view, 
continuous stock selling is a “bad” event. 
Keywords 
majority shareholders continue stock selling, social responsibility, investor’s tendency, the post period 
of equity division reform  
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1. Introduction 
In 2005, China Securities Regulatory Commission implemented the reform of equity division. This 
historic event changed the original imbalance of China’s securities market. After the “non-tradable 
shares” with Chinese characteristics were gradually transformed into tradable shares, which makes it 
come true that the full circulation of the securities market, and “the same shares with the same price” 
and “the same shares with the same right” were achieved. However, the problem of stock market 
expansion after non-tradable share gradually listed. According to China Securities Depository statistics, 
more than 80 billion lifted shares were involved in the shareholding reform, and over 5% of the lifted 
shares were reduced by the majority shareholders in 2010, the reduction was nearly 50 billion shares, it 
can be seen that the reduction of the majority shareholders after the split share reform has produced 
difference from the conventional expansion (Lin & Cao, 2012). In fact, different shareholders will 
change the proportion of shares according to their own needs, cash requirements or development needs, 
which is normal. But the “malicious reduction” of shares by majority shareholders in the securities 
market is unusual. On the one hand, “malicious reduction” of shares by majority shareholders will 
produce a negative impact on the securities market, it is easy for the market investors mistakenly think 
that there existed problems within the company, thus damaging the interests of the company; on the 
other hand, the majority shareholders may encroach on the small and medium-sized shareholders’ 
interests in the process of maliciously reducing the number of shares.  
However, because the purpose of reducing stock holdings by the majority shareholders is private, it is 
difficult to grasp the reasons for reduction actually, resulting in no relevant literatures to better define 
malicious reduction of shares by the majority shareholders. The early literatures mainly focus on the 
single reduction of majority shareholders, such as the reduction of market effects (Huang et al., 2009), 
the factors of reduction (Yuan, 2010) and the occupation of the majority shareholders in the process of 
the reduction and so on. But these scholars pay little attention to continuous reduction of shareholdings, 
only Lin and Cao (2013a) explored the reasons for continuous reduction of shareholdings by majority 
shareholders. They found that the continuous reduction will be influenced by the company’s operating 
conditions, the relationship between shareholders and the interests of the securities market investors; 
Chen (2016) found that the external auditing can curb the continuous reduction of majority 
shareholders.  
The difference from the existing literatures is that this paper takes the continuous reduction of majority 
shareholders as the research object, then in search of the inhibitory effect of social responsibility on 
continuous reductions, and to consider the intermediate effects of market investor preferences as well. 
By the empirical study, this paper finds that if the majority shareholders reduce the share holdings with 
“goodwill”, they will not take the constraints of regulatory policy into account, but reduce all shares 
one-time according to their own needs. However, in the process of malicious reduction, considering the 
“loopholes” of relevant provisions, the majority shareholders may divided the reduction of shares 
which need to be reduced originally into multiple reductions in order to avoid policy supervision, that 
is, “continuous reduction” behavior. 
The significance for this paper improved the influence of the social responsibility on the majority 
shareholders’ stock selling, in order to create a healthy and fair environment to the investors, not only 
the CSRC, but also the enterprise itself should be responsible for the stock market, and this paper give a 
strong evidence for the importance of social responsibility of the enterprise in the stock market. 
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2. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Social Responsibility and Continuous Reduction of Majority Shareholders 
The behavior of fulfilling the social responsibility by the enterprises is a kind of self-conscious action 
which is their own request derived from the internal development, that is, the self-conscious act of the 
enterprise, which is the actual contribution to the promotion of social welfare through the sublimation 
of self-demand. Li and Xiao (2011) argued that the logical starting point of behavior of fulfilling the 
social responsibility by the enterprises is derived from voluntary charitable behavior, the social 
expectation of enterprises’ behavior, the social impact of enterprises, the compliance with the spirit of 
the contract, the match of social rights and obligations, the enterprises’ response to social pressure, the 
enterprise management of social risks and the balance of integrated business goals, then ultimately 
derived from the contribution to the maximization of social welfare from enterprises. In other words, 
from the outside, the implementation of corporate social responsibility is to meet the requirements of 
society, then achieve social expectations for the enterprise. But from the inside, it is derived from 
perfection and self-regulation of the internal corporate governance system. Enterprises integrate the 
concept of social responsibility into development and bear the responsibility of the enterprise that 
concerned about internal and external stakeholders. It will make a self-regulatory effect in the 
enterprises. Under the regulatory pressures, companies can naturally protect themselves from curbing 
the behavior that are detrimental to their own development, the interests of stakeholders, social 
development or the interests of the securities market and its investors. For example, those that perform 
better social responsibility will not easily hide the related information when they take the interests of 
stakeholders into account, which will increase the transparency of information (Chih et al., 2008). It 
can be seen that as an internal governance system, social responsibility will play an important role in 
natural regulatory capacity, which can control and standardize the relevant behavior of the enterprise 
management and shareholders. 
First of all, from the moral point of view, the implementation of social responsibility will enable listed 
companies to protect the legitimate interests of the securities market and market investors under the 
guidance of moral conscience. As social responsibility is more manifested in the moral dimension, so 
among the listed companies with good social responsibility, the majority shareholders will not take 
cash out maliciously based on the volatility of securities market, and they will not easily sacrifice the 
interests of ordinary investors to complete their own interests either. Because it is a “immoral” behavior 
and the majority shareholders think that this behavior will arouse the attention of market public opinion 
and market investors, which is not conducive to their own reputation and the company’s future 
development, so there have been a number of listed companies make promise to the market investors in 
the form of a notice that they will not reduce the company shares within a certain period of time. It is 
the performance of fulfilling the social responsibility. On the other hand, the majority shareholders will 
reduce their shares through formal channels and in the formal manner according to the relevant 
provisions of the Commission if they need the reduction, as well as timely and accurately disclosure the 
information after reduction. Because these companies or majority shareholders see themselves as moral 
subject or agent to measure their own behavior based on moral standards. However, among the listed 
companies with poor performance of social responsibility, some companies will jointly disclose the 
incident of several or even annual reduction in a notice when the reduction event appeared, which 
implies the possibility of “deliberately” delaying the disclosure of information, lead to the impossibility 
of understanding the state of company the first time by the investors, it will “win” the space for the 
majority of shareholders’ benefit but undermine the interests of ordinary investors. What’s more, some 
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companies will divide a reduction of the shares into several parts, which increases the volatility of the 
company’s stock and the companies will acquire more additional benefits (Cai & Wei, 2011), it also 
reduces the degree of market regulation and investors’ attention. Obviously, this is not a “responsible” 
behavior. It can be seen that under the moral constraints, the companies with implementation of good 
social responsibility will serve maintaining market stability and the interests of ordinary investors as 
their own obligations and they will not maliciously reducing shares continuously. But the companies 
with implementation of poor social responsibility will select a number of special ways to obtain more 
self-interest through earnings management or selection of holding time and other acts in the process of 
continuous reduction (Lin & Cao, 2012; Cao & Lin, 2014). 
Second, from the perspective of shareholders, their equity itself is the interest that needs to be 
maintained in the process of social responsibility. On the one hand, listed companies need to safeguard 
the interests of shareholders in the process of fulfilling social responsibility, because the fundamental 
goal of the development of the company must be profitable, and direct beneficiaries is the majority 
shareholder, so the large beneficiaries of which to fulfill social responsibility is the majority 
shareholder, majority shareholders do not need to obtain short-term gains from the secondary market 
through continuous reductions once they can get a steady return. Kong et al. (2013) found that listed 
companies will fulfill the social responsibility better under the supervision of the media, which makes 
the earnings management of the majority shareholders, associated transactions which were hollowed 
out and irregularities were significantly reduced. It shows that social responsibility will bring more 
benefits for the majority shareholders, this kind of income may be actual money or invisible reputation, 
so that majority shareholders will balance between long and short term interests, even if they need a 
short term reduction. It will not easily cause unnecessary attention or destroy the established good 
image because of continuous reduction. On the other hand, the interests of shareholders not only 
include the interests of majority shareholders, but also the interests of ordinary market investors. In a 
company with good social responsibility, it is not easy to allow the occurrence of damage to the 
interests of small and medium investors. So that the behaviors of continuous reduction that will cause 
the stock price a greater volatility and damage the interests of ordinary investors will be reduced. 
Especially in the period of post-share split reform, because the reduction of majority shareholders is the 
core factor of affecting the stable development of capital market, making the reduction of majority 
shareholder and stable development of capital market bounded together (Jia et al., 2009). Especially 
this process is accompanied by a strong behavior that majority shareholders will encroach on the 
interests of small and medium shareholders by taking advantage of the reduction (Liu & Li, 2010). So, 
the maintenance of this stable task falls on the companies with good social responsibility. Therefore, 
from the task of safeguarding the interests of shareholders, a company with good social responsibility 
needs to maintain the long-term interests of shareholders, instead, the companies with poor social 
responsibility will be “short-sighted”, so in the process of continuous reduction, companies with poor 
social responsibility will not only lose some development opportunities, but also lose the basic trust of 
market investors. So even if the majority shareholders who have completed the reduction have received 
short-term excess returns, the long-term development gains and other gains from the majority 
shareholders will be damaged, and if they need to make up for this loss, they will need to pay more. 
Moreover, from the perspective of enterprise development, listed companies choose to fulfill their 
social responsibility behavior, usually focused on a long period of development planning period, rather 
than short-term development. Under the long-term development goals, the company does not allow the 
destruction of corporate image of the incident occurred continuously. Although some literatures found 
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that the implementation of social responsibility behavior may become the cost of the enterprise 
(Harrison & Freeman, 1999). But after the transition from “cost” to “opportunity”, social responsibility 
will give enterprises more opportunities in the long run and bring better financial performance (Ruf et 
al., 2001). So in this process, the majority shareholders will take their long-term interests into account, 
and will not take the initiative to undermine the company’s image or undermine the possibility of future 
greater gains, so there is no need and no reason for continuous reduction. At the same time, the 
continuous reduction of majority shareholders is contrary to the social responsibility thought advocated 
by the listed companies. Under the governance of the social responsibility supervision, the cost of the 
majority shareholders to reduce the holdings may be far greater than the reduction of earnings, and thus 
they will not easily reduce the share holdings continuously in the short term. 
In addition, from a social point of view, the community will be more concerned about the company 
with the implementation of better social responsibility, which is one of the reasons for actively fulfills 
social responsibility. Xu et al. (2011) found that media attention and public opinion play an active role 
in the fulfillment of social responsibility of listed companies, and the media are more interested in the 
companies with better social responsibility, and this concern, in turn, enable the company to fulfill its 
social responsibilities better. At the same time, the securities market will also pay enough attention and 
support to companies that fulfill their social responsibilities (Godfrey, 2005). So in the case with many 
concerns, the invisible external regulatory power is formed. Although this regulation does not have a 
coercive effect, it can give a certain constraint on the listed company, because the listed companies 
have formed a good impression on the community and market investors, once the companies 
continuously make malicious reduction, they will cause even more impact on the heart of social and 
market investors, and the adverse effects will even be greater than the general behavior of listed 
companies which behave the same. In the poorly performing companies, because of the lack of social 
concern, the majority shareholders have more opportunities to achieve continuous reductions through 
various channels, and because of the lack of sufficient attention, the majority shareholders of these 
companies can try and make profit many times. Therefore, these arguments lead to our first hypothesis. 
H1. There is a significant negative correlation between social responsibility and continuous reduction 
of majority shareholders, that is, the lower the probability of continuous reduction of its majority 
shareholders in the listed companies with better social responsibility, and if the listed companies with 
worse behavior of fulfill the social responsibility, the probability of its majority shareholder holdings 
will be greater. 
2.2 Social Responsibility, Tendency of Investors and Continuous Reduction of Majority Shareholders 
The market value of listed companies will be affected by many factors, but the market investor’s 
tendency is an important factor. The market is largely determined by the investors, when investors 
believe that a listed company has good development potential and future prospects, they will be sought 
after the company’s stock, which prompted the stock price rise, and even more than its actual book 
value. But if the investors are not optimistic about a listed company and they think the company does 
not have a good future development potential, or investors find that their own interests are occupied by 
majority shareholders or management, they will lose confidence in the company, and then take the 
“foot vote” approach to punish it (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In other words, the securities market will 
give listed companies the opportunity to accompany the punishment, but whether the opportunity or 
punishment depends entirely on the cooperation between the listed company’s own performance and 
the tendency of the market investors, or depending on the presented state of listed company in 
accordance with the attitude of the market investors. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2004) found 
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that rational corporate management would choose cash dividends based on whether there was a 
dividend premium or a discount in the market. Therefore, for majority shareholders with reduced 
tendencies, in order to obtain more secondary market returns, they need to find ways to deliver good 
information to the market, such as the most direct earnings management behavior (Cai, N. & Wei, M., 
2011), thus gaining short-term high market value. It can be seen that market behavior or market 
conditions will affect the choice of majority shareholders’ holdings. 
First, from the perspective of the market itself, Zhang Tao (2008) found that after the split share 
structure reform, China’s stock market has changed from inefficient market to weak efficient market, 
indicating that the stock market has been able to contain stock prices and some transaction information. 
In other words, rational market investors and rational majority shareholders or management will game 
through the stock between the buy and sell. When the market investors give the company stock trust, 
the majority shareholders will be able to find this trust, and will not easily make damage to the 
company’s image; and when the listed companies issued a benign business signal, the market investors 
will give the company enough support. Of course, this market investors and listed companies between 
the “good” relationship once broken, the market investors and the interests of listed companies will be 
lost. 
Second, from the perspective of market investors, because it is difficult to determine the true intention 
and reasons for the reduction of majority shareholders, so more market investors will see the reduction 
as a “bad” behavior, that is, when the listed company had a reduction, the market investors will think 
that there are some problems within the company, thus they will treat the company’s stock carefully. 
Empirical evidence also shows that the reduction has had an impact on the securities market, there will 
be a long time in the reduce effect, bringing the decline of market price (Huang et al., 2009), and the 
reduction will also bring investors the forecast that the company’s profitability about pessimistic future, 
then accelerated the stock price fell (Fan, J., 2008). At the same time, if the majority shareholder reduce 
the share holdings after a period of time, and not reduced once again, the market will gradually ease the 
impact of the previous reduction. However, if the reduction event occurs again after the first reduction, 
especially in a relatively short period of time occurs the reduction event again by the same majority 
shareholder, it will accelerate the volatility of stock prices and result in a more significant reduction 
effect (Johnston et al., 2005). In addition, such as external audits and other regulatory actions will be 
through their own behavior (such as different audit opinion), give a corresponding signal to the 
company financial status represented by the majority shareholders’ continuing reduction and so on 
(Chen et al., 2016). On the one hand, the market investors will be more cautious on the continuous 
reduction of the event, because the market investors think that the majority shareholders grasp more 
internal information than the market investors, and they see continuous reduction as the company’s 
“problem”. On the other hand, in the event of the first reduction, a rational market investor will 
considered whether he should invest in the company or withdraw his existing investment, and after a 
continuous reduction, the market investor will be less optimistic about the company’s future, then they 
will not invest in the company or leave immediately, which brought the company’s share price further 
decline. In other words, this time the stock market has “abandoned” the company. 
Moreover, from the perspective of majority shareholders, rational majority shareholders will be aware 
of market investors for the attitude of the reduction, and thus choose their own behavior. As described 
by Lin and Cao (2013a), there is a difference in the market value between China’s stock market and 
non-reduced listed companies, that is, market investors will have different tendencies for different 
companies, if the rational shareholders find this difference existed in the tendency of market investors, 
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that is, the market investor does not have a special preference for the company that has a reduction, and 
the market value of the holding company is not significantly lower (or even higher, because there will 
be speculation in the market or in the short-term the stock price will be untrue because of the 
asymmetry of information) than the company that did not occur in the reduction, the majority 
shareholders will use this opportunity to continuously reduce the shares in order to maximize the 
benefits. However, if there exist opposite situation in the market, that is, when the stock market price in 
the company with significant reduction is much lower than the stock price of the company without 
reduction, the majority shareholders in order to avoid greater losses of their own interests, or to protect 
the company’s image and long-development, they will not blindly reduce the share holdings 
continuously. It can be seen that the rational majority shareholders will give the market investors a 
tendency to respond, because rational majority shareholders need to consider the relationship between 
short-term reductions and long-term earnings even if they choose reduction. Especially because of the 
existence of information asymmetry, the majority shareholders can better choose the reduction time, 
then the market will not let investors abandon, but obtain the results of maximizing the proceeds. 
Hence, we posit the following hypothesis.  
H2. There is a significant negative correlation between the investor’s tendency and the continuous 
reduction of the majority shareholders, that is, the lower the probability that the majority shareholders 
will continue to reduce the holdings in the listed companies with more inclined investors. While in the 
listed companies with less market tendency, the probability of continuous reduction by the majority 
shareholders will be higher. 
The behavior of listed companies to fulfill their social responsibilities will be found and given the 
corresponding response by the securities market. Empirical evidence suggests that social responsibility 
is directly sought by investors in the securities market, regardless of whether the behavior of social 
responsibility is short-term or long-term (Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006; Ye & Wang, 2013), which 
means that market investors will value the behavior of listed company to fulfill their social 
responsibility. They assume that the conduct of social responsibility will protect their legitimate rights 
and interests, thus showing supportive attitude. Similarly, the majority shareholders of listed companies 
will also feel the pursuit of abandonment and abandonment from market investors, they will find that 
the behavior of social responsibility can be recognized by market investors. In particular, this behavior 
will also generate value in the stock price and enhance the company’s share price (Kim et al., 2014). As 
a result, under the strength of securities investors, the inhibiting effect of social responsibility on the 
main reduction of majority shareholders will be amplified invisibly. On the one hand, when the 
majority shareholders find the market investors sought after the company’s stock because the company 
fulfilled the social responsibility, the majority shareholders need to cooperate with the company to 
support the company’s development, especially the majority shareholders who do not reduce all the 
shares, they will not destroy the good image of themselves and the company in the eyes of investors 
through continuous reduction. On the other hand, when the market investors recognize that listed 
company has fulfilled their social responsibility, they will show the pursuit of the company’s share 
price. But when the majority shareholders continue to reduce their holdings, the market investors will 
reduce the trust of the company, which will offset the positive impact of social responsibility, and in 
this case, the rational management will find the company’s market value difference, then they can only 
continue to strengthen the implementation of fulfilling social responsibility to reduce the adverse 
effects of continuous reduction of majority shareholders. And rational majority shareholders will also 
find changes in market investors, in the process of fulfilling social responsibility they will not 
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deliberately reduce holdings continuously. It can be seen that in the suppression of social responsibility, 
once the majority shareholders find the behavior that market investors sought after company’s stock, 
then they will not deliberately reduce share holdings continuously, especially when they need not cash 
the current majority shareholders immediately. Because in the case that the market investors recognize 
and sought after the company’s stock, the company’s future earnings will show a better development 
trend, and the company’s stock value and price in the next period of time may show a better situation, 
so that the majority shareholders will get more revenue, thus there is no need to break this trend 
through the behavior of continuous reduction, and if they do that, even the basic gains will not be 
available. Hence, we put forward the following hypotheses. 
H3. After considering the influence of investors’ tendencies, the impact of social responsibility on 
continuously reducing shareholdings by majority shareholders will be significantly enlarged. 
 
3. Variables, Models, and Data 
3.1 Specification of Variables  
Explained variable: Continuous Reduction of majority shareholders (CR). Lin and Cao (2014a) 
designed the index of majority shareholders’ continuous reduction based on whether the company has 
two or more shareholders who reduce shareholdings or whether appear two or more reduction events in 
the company, but this indicator can’t measure the “malicious” mentality of shareholders in the process 
of continuous reduction, because the reduction of a shareholder may not be affected by other 
shareholders. Therefore, the design of the index in this article is based on whether the same shareholder 
has a continuous reduction in the same fiscal year, that is, if it occurred two or more reduction events 
by the same shareholder in the listed company, then CR=1. Otherwise, if it didn’t occur reduction 
events by majority shareholders that year, or did not occur a number of reduction events by the same 
shareholders (even if there are multiple majority shareholders reduce holdings once a time), then CR=0. 
Explanatory variable: Social Responsibility (CSR). The index of early measurement of social 
responsibility are mostly based on whether the listed company disclose the information in the form of 
publish a report on social responsibility. However, this form can’t distinguish the differences in social 
responsibility among different companies. And according to Stakeholder Theory, the company’s daily 
behavior itself contains the implementation of social responsibility, or social responsibility should be a 
subtle behavior. Shen (2005) provides an analytical approach that takes the interests of the stakeholders 
into account, which by using the balance sheet and the income statement for analysis. The paper argues 
that the balance sheet liabilities and the owner’s equity report the source of the company’s funds, which 
include the funds provided by the suppliers, employees and government, as well as the resulting 
benefits. Owners’ equity is considered to represent the shareholder’s claim to the company in the 
narrow sense, but it does not fully reflect the funds from the shareholders. So the company has three 
types of funds, namely, liabilities, shareholders’ equity provided by the shareholders and the 
company’s own funds. The last one is the “main interests”. And the main interests are actually the 
result of a joint effort from the shareholders, creditors, customers, suppliers, employees, government 
and other stakeholders. Therefore, with reference to Shen (2005), Xiao and Yang (2011), this paper 
builds a comprehensive index of social responsibility based on the measurement of the interests of 
different stakeholders, namely: 
CSR=a1 GR+a2 ER+a3 SR+a4 ZR+a5 YR+a6 KR               (1) 
The above formula shows that social responsibility is a different degree of responsibility for different 
shareholders, different measures of interest are as follows: 
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GR=Responsibility Contribution of Government=(Taxes Paid-Refunds Received)/Cash Inflow from 
Operating Activities×100%; ER=Responsibility Contribution Rate of Employee=Cash Paid to 
Employees and Cash Paid for Employees×100%; SR=Responsibility Contribution of 
Shareholder=Dividend/Revenue×100%; ZR=Responsibility Contribution Rate of Creditor=Financial 
Expense/Operating Income×100%; YR=Responsibility Contribution Rate of Supplier=Cash Outflow 
from Cash/Business Activity for Purchase of Goods, Payment of Labor Services×100%; 
KR=Contribution of Customer Liability=Operating Cost/Operating Income×100%. 
The above indicators reflect how much of each dollar income of listed companies paid to the relevant 
stakeholders, and these indicators eliminate the impact of the size of the company to some extent. At 
the same time, in the formula (1), a1-a6 are the weights of different stakeholders’ interests, according to 
the thinking of Shen (2005), the calculation method of weight value are respectively as follows: 
a1=(MR/Size)×[GR/(GR+ER +SR+ZR+YR+KR)]; 
a2=(MR/Size)×[ER/(GR+ER +SR+ZR+YR+KR)]; 
a3=(EQ/Size)+(MR/Size)×[SR/(GR+ER +SR+ZR+YR+KR)]; 
a4=(DT/Size)+(MR/Size)×[ZR/(GR+ER +SR+ZR+YR+KR)]; 
a5=(MR/Size)×[YR/(GR+ER +SR+ZR+YR+KR)]; 
a6=(MR/Size)×[KR/(GR+ER +SR+ZR+YR+KR)]. 
In calculating the weights above, apart from the identified variables, EQ refers to the equity, that is the 
sum of the total share capital of the company and the capital reserve; DT refers to the debt, that is the 
sum of short-term borrowings, non-current liabilities due within one year, long-term borrowings and 
bonds payable. Size refers to the company’s total assets; MR refers to the main interests, that is, the rest 
of the company’s assets after deducting equity and debt from the total assets of the company. 
Explanatory variables: the tendency of investor (Market): investors tend to show the market for 
investors to pursue or not pursue a class of listed companies, so different companies will be different 
from the market value. The change of the market value of the company may also be due to the 
profitability of the company. Therefore, this paper uses the market book value ratio to measure the 
difference of the company value while considering the change of the book value of the company. At the 
same time, taking the differences in market value between the companies with reduction of holdings 
and the companies without reduction of holdings in into account, this paper adding an adjusted factor 
about value difference in the companies with and without reduction of holdings, namely: 
      tjRtjNRtiti MBMBMBMarket ,,,,,, lnlnln                  (2) 
In the formula above, MB refers to the ratio of the company’s market value to the book value at the end 
of the year,  NRMBln  refers to the mean value obtained in the non-reduced company group; 
 RMBln  refers to the average value obtained in the company group with reduction of holdings; i 
refers to the company, t means the year, j means the industry. That is, the investor orientation index is 
the ratio of market value to book value after listed companies have been adjusted, while the adjusted 
factor is the difference in market book value ratio between the company with and without reduction of 
holdings in the same industry. The specific formula for MB is: 
MB=Market Value/Total Assets=(A Shares×the Closing Price of A Shares at the End of the year+B 
Shares×the Closing Price of B Shares at the End of the year×Year-end Exchange Rate+Total Liabilities 
at the End of the Year)/Total Assets. 
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The larger the market value is, the higher the market investor’s tendency will be; while the smaller the 
market value is, the lower the market investor’s preference will be. 
Control variables: Reference to Helwege et al. (2007) and other studies, control variables are listed in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Variables Definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Continuous reduction (CR) 
If a shareholder in the company has twice or more of the reductions, 
CR=1, otherwise CR=0 
Social responsibility (CSR) Formula (1): a1 GR+a2 ER+a3 SR+a4 ZR+a5 YR+a6 KR 
The tendency of investors 
(Market) Formula (2): 
      tjRtjNRti MBMBMB ,,,,,, lnlnln   
Assets and liabilities (Debt) (Total liabilities Total assets)×100% 
Return on assets (ROA) (Net profit/Average total assets)×100% 
Ownership concentration (H10) 
The sum of square of the proportion of the top 10 shareholders of 
the company 
Market process (Index) Regional marketization index provided by Fan Gang et al (2011) 
Whether it is the largest 
shareholder reduce holdings 
(WFBS) 
In the company where the reduction occurred, if the reduction of 
majority shareholders as the largest shareholder, then WFBS=1, 
otherwise WFBS=0; In companies that do not have a reduction, then 
WFBS=0 
 
3.2 Empirical Model 
According to the previous research hypothesis and the design of the research variables, this paper 
constructs the empirical model: 
    




 

CWFBSIndexH
ROADebtMarketCSRMarketCSR
CRit
876
54321
10
log
    (3) 
Since the explanatory variable is a dummy variable, the empirical model is a binary selection logit 
model. The estimate of the model is completed by the coefficient maximum likelihood function, where 
 is the parameter to be estimated, C is a constant term and   is a random interference term. 
3.3 Data Description 
On the one hand, the SFC began to split the share reform in 2005 and stipulated that the listed 
companies need to be completed by the end of 2006, so after 2007, there have been large-scale 
reductions; on the other hand, the new accounting standards have been in the full implementation of 
listed companies in China in 2007. Therefore, in order to harmonize the measurement standard of 
variables, this paper chooses the companies that are not delisting in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 
listed companies in 2007-2013 as the original sample. The number of specific annual samples and the 
selection process according to the relevant criteria are listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Number of Samples and Selection Process 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
All A shares 1539 1616 1715 2064 2346 2501 2503 14284
Deletion 
IPO sample 126 77 99 349 282 155 2 1090 
Financial industry 
sample 
22 33 33 35 40 43 44 250 
Small plates, GEM 
samples 
102 201 272 362 682 925 1053 3597 
ST samples 169 150 147 161 143 97 52 919 
Missing data or singular 
samples 
27 32 43 72 72 86 77 409 
Total 1093 1123 1121 1085 1127 1195 1275 8019 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Reduction by Majority Shareholders 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
The number of companies with 
continuous reduction samples 
155 82 156 75 49 39 40 596 
The number of companies with 
reduction samples 
222 157 216 171 124 95 99 1084 
Accounting for the proportion of 
all samples 
14.18% 7.30% 13.92% 6.91% 4.35% 3.26% 3.14% 7.43%
Accounting for the proportion of 
companies with reduction 
69.82% 52.23% 72.22% 43.86% 39.52% 41.05% 40.40% 54.98%
 
Table 3 lists the descriptive statistical status of the majority shareholders’ continuous reductions. 
Overall, about 7.43% of the sample companies occurred that a majority shareholder reduced holdings 
twice or for more than two times, accounting for 54.98% of the number of companies with the 
reduction of holdings, indicating that more than half of the companies with reduction have continuous 
reduction, that is, among the companies with reduction, there will appear more of the emergence of 
multiple reduction events. From the annual situation, the proportion of reducing holdings by majority 
shareholders in 2007 is highest, there are nearly 70% of the companies whose majority shareholders 
reduce shareholdings have continuous reduction in the situation, which is related to the split share 
reform in 2007; But the proportion of companies with continuous reduction in 2009 is highest. In the 
remainder of the year, the proportion of the company’s total holdings was below 10%, and the 
proportion after 2011 was even below 5%, and after 2010, the proportion of companies holding 
reductions was under 50%. This situation also showing a gradual downward trend, indicating that over 
time, the rationality of reducing holdings by majority shareholders gradually increased. 
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Table 4. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation 
CR 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.26 
CSR 0.29 0.28 1.17 -2.63 0.18 
Market -0.75 -0.69 2.83 -3.47 0.55 
Debt 0.52 0.54 1.26 0.01 0.19 
ROA 0.03 0.03 1.42 -1.00 0.08 
H10 0.18 0.14 1.22 0.00 0.13 
Index 8.78 8.93 11.80 0.38 2.08 
WFBS 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.14 
 
Table 4 lists the descriptive statistical results of the main variables. In addition to the explanatory 
variables, the mean of explanatory variables CSR is 0.29, but there were significant differences in the 
social responsibility status of the listed companies, and some corporate social responsibility values 
were even negative; the mean of market is -0.75, but the same market for different listed companies 
investors tend to a greater degree of difference. In the control variable, the mean of variable Debt is 
0.52, indicating that the total liabilities of the sample company account for more than half of the total 
assets; the mean of ROA is 0.03, indicating that the net profit of the sample company accounts for 
about 3% of the total assets; the mean of H10 is 0.18, indicating that the sample of company’s equity 
concentration is not high, but different companies have a large difference in the concentration of equity. 
The mean of the index is 8.78, and the regional protection and governance degree of the firms in 
different regions are also different. The mean of WFBS is 0.02, indicating that about 2% of the listed 
companies in the sample occurred the event that the first majority shareholder reduce the 
shareholdings. 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 5. Relevance Test Results 
 CR CSR Market CSR×M Debt ROA H10 Index WFBS
CR 1 -0.04*** -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.12*** -0.03** 0.42***
CSR -0.04*** 1 0.12*** -0.48*** 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.01 
Market -0.12*** 0.20*** 1 0.72*** 0.30*** -0.28*** 0.10*** 0.04*** -0.06***
CSR×M -0.05*** -0.68*** 0.37*** 1 0.17*** -0.38*** 0.02** -0.03** -0.05***
Debt -0.02* 0.11*** 0.28*** 0.13*** 1 -0.37*** 0.05*** -0.01 0.02 
ROA -0.02** 0.21*** -0.17*** -0.30*** -0.28*** 1 0.16*** 0.07*** -0.03**
H10 -0.12*** 0.08*** 0.10*** -0.02* 0.05*** 0.11*** 1 0.05*** -0.01 
Index -0.03*** 0.09*** 0.06*** -0.02 -0.02 0.04*** 0.05*** 1 -0.01 
WFBS 0.42*** 0.02** -0.06*** -0.03*** 0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.01 1 
Note. The lower left corner is the normal correlation coefficient value, and the upper right corner is the 
Spearman correlation coefficient value. 
*Indicate significant difference at the 10% level (two-sided). 
**Indicate significant difference at the 5% level (two-sided). 
***Indicate significant difference at the 1% level (two-sided). 
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Table 5 shows the correlation test results for variables. Explain that the correlation coefficient between 
the variable and the explanatory variable and the control variable is not high, all below 0.5, which 
indicates that there is no problem of multicollinearity between variables. 
4.3 Single Variable Analysis 
 
Table 6. Univariate Test Results 
Variables Grouping criteria N Mean T value Z value 
CSR 
CR=1 596 0.288 
3.862*** 4.339*** 
CR=0 7423 0.316 
Market 
CR=1 596 -1.003 
11.506*** 12.615*** 
CR=0 7423 -0.750 
Note. The T value is the mean test, the Z value is the Wilcoxon test. 
*Indicate significant difference at the 10% level (two-sided). 
**Indicate significant difference at the 5% level (two-sided). 
***Indicate significant difference at the 1% level (two-sided). 
 
In order to test the difference of social responsibility and investor’s tendency of different listed 
companies, this paper divides the sample into continuous reduction group (CR=1) and non-continuous 
reduction group (CR=0) according to variable CR, and carries out mean difference test. From the 
variable CSR, the mean value of the CSR group was significantly lower than that of the continuous 
reduction group. The T test value and the Wilcoxon test value could be tested by the 1% confidence 
level, indicating that the company with no continuous reduction have better performance of social 
responsibility, we can see whether the implementation of social responsibility has a significant impact 
on the continuous reduction of majority shareholders; from the variable Market point of view, 
continuous reduction group Market average is also significantly lower than the continuous reduction 
group, which T test Values and Wilcoxon test values were tested with a 1% confidence level, indicating 
that non-consecutive holdings of listed companies received more market attention. Investors’ 
tendencies also have an important impact on the continuous reduction by majority shareholders. And 
whether the shareholders choose a continuous reduction will be affected by the market. 
4.4 Multivariate Regression Test 
 
Table 7. The Result of the Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CSR 
-0.622*** 
(0.229) 
 
-2.255*** 
(0.528) 
Market  
-0.686*** 
(0.084) 
-0.335*** 
(0.119) 
CSR×Market   
-1.549*** 
(0.357) 
Debt -0.512** -0.038 0.166 
ROA -0.066 -0.696 -0.831 
H10 -5.249*** -5.098*** -5.135*** 
Index -0.044** -0.036* -0.030* 
WFBS 4.963*** 4.846*** 5.005*** 
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C -1.196*** -2.268*** -1.842*** 
McFadden R2 0.179 0.192 0.197 
LR Statistic 757.394*** 814.493*** 836.579*** 
Note. *Indicate significant difference at the 10% level (two-sided). 
**Indicate significant difference at the 5% level (two-sided). 
***Indicate significant difference at the 1% level (two-sided). 
 
Table 7 lists some of the results of the multivariate regression test. Firstly, the overall test value of the 
regression results can be checked by the significance level of the conventional confidence level, 
indicating that there is no significant difference between the actual probability distribution of the 
explanatory variables and the predicted distribution fitted by the explanatory variables and the control 
variables, the result is credible. 
Specific to the explanatory variables of the test results, (1) shows that the coefficient between the 
explanatory variable CSR and CR is significantly negative (significant level is 1%), which indicates 
that the fulfillment of the social responsibility of the listed company is the same as that of the majority 
shareholder. There is a significant negative correlation between the holdings, that is, the better the 
social responsibility of the listed companies, the corresponding occurrence of the majority shareholder 
of the probability of reduction is even lower, which for the previous study hypothesis 1 provides 
empirical evidence support; regression results (2) shows that the explanatory variable Market is 
significantly negative as the coefficient value between the explanatory variables CR (the level of 
significance is 1%), indicating that the listed companies with more inclined investors, the probability of 
continuous reduction by majority shareholders is even lower. Regression result (3) takes the results of 
the investor’s reciprocity into account, the coefficient between the variable CSR and the explanatory 
variable CR is significantly negative (the level of significant level is 1%), and the coefficient between 
the variable Market and the explanatory variable CR is also significantly negative (significant level of 
1%), the interaction term can be tested by the significance of the conventional confidence level, 
indicating that after considering the investor’s influence, the behavior of listed companies to fulfill their 
social responsibility will restrict the continuous reduction of majority shareholders, and compare the 
regression results (3) with the regression results (1) in the variable CSR coefficient values found that 
the absolute value of coefficient in regression result (3) is significantly larger than the regression result 
(1), indicating that after considering the influencing factors of investors’ tendencies, the effect of social 
responsibility on the continuous reduction of majority shareholders has been obviously strengthened. 
This conclusion provides empirical evidence for the previous hypothesis 3. 
4.5 Robustness Test 
In order to prove the reliability of the research conclusion, this paper carries out the robustness test. 
First, the regression tests were performed in the regression model to control annual factors and industry 
factors. Second, considering the possibility of multicollinearity caused by the inter-variable correlation 
in the regression model, the ridge regression test will be performed. Third, taking the possible 
endogeneity between variables into account, that is, the endogenous problem of social responsibility 
and investors’ tendencies will make the sample self-selection bias, such as investors deliberately 
choose high social responsibility or low social responsibility to seek special interests. Therefore, this 
paper uses Heckman two-stage regression method to solve the endogenous problem of social 
responsibility and investors’ tendencies. In the two-stage regression of the social responsibility 
variables, the first stage is the social responsibility estimation model, join the exogenous variables such 
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as the previous period of social responsibility, accounting firm audit and so on, and the resulting IMR 
is used as a control variable for the second stage regression. In the two-stage regression of the 
investor’s tendency variable, the first stage adds the exogenous instrument variable, the accounting 
firm’s audit and other exogenous instrument variables, and the resulting IMR is also used as the control 
variable for the second stage regression. Fourth, considering a variety of measurement methods of 
social responsibility, different literatures differ in the way they measure social responsibility. In 
addition to the method of calculating the degree of social responsibility of the listed company, this 
paper further uses the dummy variable of the listed company “whether to disclose the social 
responsibility report” instead of the original social responsibility variable, and then carries on the 
regression test. The results of the robustness test are basically consistent with the previous empirical 
results. 
 
5. Further Analysis: When Will Majority Shareholders Choose to Complete Continuous 
Reduction? 
Empirical evidence shows that the majority shareholders will choose the time to reduce holdings (Lin 
& Cao, 2012; Cai, 2012), which shows that the majority shareholders will choose some time without 
attention to reduce shareholdings, so that they can avoid some extra time with concern. But the 
previous empirical evidence shows that social responsibility will inhibit the continuous reduction. Does 
this mean that majority shareholders will avoid a continuous reduction in the disclosure of social 
responsibility report period? This article also found that the events of reduction in the second half of 
the year are far more than the first half of the year. There for, in the point of SCR, the majority 
shareholders will avoid reducing share-holders in the period of disclosing SCR, for the reduction is 
contrary to the fulfillment of social responsibility.  
 
6. Research Conclusion 
After the split share structure reform period, the reduction of holdings by majority shareholders had a 
greater impact on the stock market. On the one hand, a significant increase in the market supply after 
the non-tradable shares lifted, leading to oversupply, leading to oversupply and market equilibrium 
prices are naturally falling. On the other hand, market investors also follow the majority shareholders to 
sell shares, resulting in the second decline of market prices. In particular, it is the malicious holdings of 
majority shareholders, not only further influence the securities market, but also make the original 
normal fluctuation of shares becomes “abnormal”. Therefore, this paper analyzes the effect of social 
responsibility on the continuous reduction of the majority shareholders by using the annual sample of 
8019 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen during the period of 2007 to 2013. The paper 
analyzes the effect of social responsibility on the continuous reduction of the majority shareholders 
with considering the mediating role of investor’s tendency. The study finds that there is a significant 
negative correlation between social responsibility and continuous reduction of majority shareholders 
from the view of internal governance effect, that is, the better the social responsibility is performed, the 
lower probability of continuous reduction. There was also a significant negative correlation between 
the degree of the tendency of investors and the continuous reduction of the same majority shareholders, 
namely in the listed companies with the investors propensity, the lower probability of majority 
shareholders reduction. And after considering the impact of investor’s tendency, the inhibitory effect of 
social responsibility was amplified, indicating that the market will agree the inhibitory effect arising 
from the social responsibility within the listed companies. Further study found that majority 
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shareholders will avoid the period of disclosing social responsibility report to reduce shareholdings. 
In addition, as the regulation of the reduction of majority shareholders, relying solely on the regulatory 
policy is not enough, because even the perfect policy may have loopholes, the source of the idea that 
majority shareholders reduce holdings can’t be removed. So in addition to the proposed social 
responsibility and the attitude of the securities market investors, how to improve the management 
system through the regulation of majority shareholders reductions should be the follow-up study. 
 
References 
Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2004). A Catering Theory of Dividends. Journal of Finance, 59(3), 
1125-1165. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00658.x 
Cai, N. (2012). Information advantage, timing behavior and insider trading of majority shareholders. 
Journal of Financial Research, (5). 
Cai, N., & Wei, M. H. (2011). Shareholder relations, collusion and the transfer of majority shareholders’ 
interests: A study based on the lifting of the ban on stock transactions. Journal of Applied 
Statistics and Management, (9). 
Cao, G. H., & Lin, C. D. D. (2013). Intertemporal holdings of controlling shareholders based on 
intertemporal embezzlement. System Engineering-Theory and Practice, (6). 
Cao, G. H., Lin, C., & Huang, J. (2014). Large non reduction and real earnings management. Business 
Managent Journal, (1). 
Chen, W., Lin, C., & Peng, C. (2016). External audit and continuous reduction of majority 
shareholders—Based on the samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies during 
2007 and 2014. Finance and Accounting Monthly, (7). 
Chih, H. L., Shen, C. H., & Kang, F. C. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility, Investor Protection, 
and Earnings Management: Some International Evidence. Journal of Business Ethics, 39(1), 
179-198. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9383-7 
Fan, G., & Wang, X. L. (2011). China’s marketization index: The relative process of marketization in 
various regions, 2011 Report. Economic Science Press. 
Fan, J. J. (2008). Why does the stock market decline only blame “the size of non”? New Economics, 
(12). 
Gardberg, N. A., & Fombrun, C. J. (2006). Corporate Citizenship: Creating Intangible Assets Across 
Institutional Environments. Academy of Management Review, 31(2), 329-346. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2006.20208684 
Godfrey, P. C. (2005). The Relationship between Corporate Philanthropy and Shareholder Wealth: A 
Risk Management Perspective. Academy of Management Review, 30(4), 777-798. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2005.18378878 
Harrison, J., & Freeman, R. (1999). Stakeholders, Social Responsibility, and Performance: Empirical 
Evidence and Theoretical Perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, 42(5), 479-485. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/256971 
Helwege, J., Pirinsky, C., & Stulz, R. M. (2007). Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of 
the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership. Journal of Finance, 62(3), 995-1028. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01229.x 
Huang, J. H., Yin, Z. J., & Su, R. (2009). Study on the reduction effect of the lifting of restricted shares 
in China’s stock market. Journal of Management Sciences, (4). 
Huang, Z. Z., Zhou, W., & Xie, W. L. (2009). Motivation of majority shareholders to reduce shares: 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp                Journal of Business Theory and Practice                 Vol. 6, No. 1, 2018 
28 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Theory and evidence. Economic Review, (6). 
Jia, M., Zhang, Z., & Wan, D. F. (2009). Share reform scheme, agency costs and the sale of majority 
shareholder ban shares. Finance and Accounting, (11). 
Johnston, J., Madura, J., & Harper, J. T. (2005). Interaction between Short Selling and Potential Insider 
Selling in the IPO Aftermarket. Journal of Financial Services Research, 27(3), 283-302. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-005-1805-z 
Kim, Y., Li, H., & Li, S. (2014). Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock Price Crash Risk. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 43(6), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.02.013 
Kong, D. M., Xu, M. L., & Huang, J. (2013). Environmental pollution, media exposure and reactions of 
different types of investors. Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology (Social 
Science Edition).  
Li, W. Y., & Xiao, H. J. (2011). The logic of corporate social responsibility. China industrial 
economics, (10). 
Lin, C., & Cao, G. H. (2012). Management of earnings, non-annual effect and reduction of majority 
shareholders. Southern Economy, (12). 
Lin, C., & Cao, G. H. (2013). Regional marketization process and the reduction of majority 
shareholders. Shanghai Finance, (4). 
Lin, C., & Cao, G. H. (2013). Why majority shareholders continue to reduce share holdings? Corporate 
Finance Research, (1). 
Liu, Y. L., & Li, J. J. (2010). Reduction of majority shareholders, equity transfer premiums and private 
benefits of control. Inquiry into Economic Issues, (8). 
MacKinlay, A. C. (1997). Event Studies in Economics and Finance. Journal of Economic Literature, 
35(1), 13-39. 
Ruf, B. M., Muralidhar, K., Brown, R. M., Janney, J. J., & Paul, K. (2001). An Empirical Investigation 
of the Relationship between Change in Corporate Social Performance and Financial Performance: 
A Stakeholder Theory Perspective. Journal of Business Ethics, 32(2), 143-156. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010786912118 
Shen, H. T. (2005). Research on the relationship between corporate social responsibility and corporate 
financial performance—Based on the theory of Stakeholder. Doctoral Dissertation of Xiamen 
University.  
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Majority shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488. https://doi.org/10.1086/261385 
Wang, T. T. (2009). Reduction: Liquidity demand or signal transmission—A case study based on 
CITIC Securities. Economy Management, (7). 
Xiao, Z. P., Yang, J., & Zhu, H. P. (2011). The impact of corporate governance on Corporate Social 
Responsibility—Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies. Securities Market Herald, 
(6). 
Xie, L. (2009). Encounter the three largest shareholder of continuous reduction, kinwa performance 
decline and in “a crisis of confidence”. Securities Daily.  
Xu, L. P., Xin, Y., & Zhu, J. G. (2011). Media attention and the performance of social responsibility of 
Listed Companies—An Empirical Study Based on Wenchuan earthquake donation. Management 
World, (3). 
Ye, C. G., & Wang, Z. (2013). Social responsibility, performance evaluation and market reaction. Soft 
Science, (6). 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jbtp                Journal of Business Theory and Practice                 Vol. 6, No. 1, 2018 
29 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
Yeh, Y. H., Shu, P. G., Lee, T. S., & Su, Y. H. (2009). Non-Tra中国会计评论 dable Share Reform and 
Corporate Governance in the Chinese Stock Market. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 17(4), 457-475. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00754.x 
Yu, H. M., & Xu, L. B. (2010). Ultimate controlling shareholder control and the reduction of majority 
shareholders under the background of full circulation. The Study of Finance and Economics, (1). 
Yuan, Y., & Hong, F. (2010). Theoretical and empirical analysis of the factors affecting the reduction 
of majority shareholders. Chinese Accounting Review, (4). 
Zhang, T. (2008). Empirical analysis of the effect of split share structure reform on the effectiveness of 
China’s stock market. Jianghai Accademic Journal, (3). 
Zhang, X. Z., & Hong, F. (2008). Policy orientation analysis of non-reduction of size. Finance and 
Accounting, (11). 
 
